Is A getting better or worse? If not, he votes for change i. The broad point that uncertainty can make parties diverge was also a well made, although I thought that the specific mechanisms the book used to make the point were not very good.
But several problems force modifications of this model. But these benefits are weighted by the infinitesimal probability that one vote will determine the outcome. New parties can be most successfully launched immediately after some significant change in the distribution of ideological views among eligible voters.
There are two distinct ways to think about this. Consider a typical voter: If B would have been identical, the voter is indifferent and abstains. If B would have provided equal utility but by different means, then the voter concludes: In a two-party system, it is rational for each party to encourage voters to be irrational by making its platform vague and ambiguous.
If assumes that voters vote in their material self-interest, then voting intelligently for those material self-interests is a public good to those who share those material interests.
If one assumes that voters vote altruistically, then intelligent voting is a public good to everyone. Here is a list of the key propositions Downs attempts to prove in chapter eight: If it is getting better, then the voter will forgive A for early failures to deliver utility.
I suspect that one of the major contribution was viewing political parties as working to reach political office for the private rewards of political service, prestige, pay and seedier rewards, but I tend to discount this because I am so familiar with this argument.
As such, even small voting costs make turnout irrational. In multiparty systems, the same line of thinking works, but with one qualifier: Downs seems perplexed by this result, since it clearly predicts much lower turnout than actually occurs.
Depending on the ideological distribution of voters in a given political communityelectoral outcomes can be stable and peaceful or wildly varied and even result in violent revolution. Both books include numerous dubious arguments, but both manage to make some very important arguments.
No one party or even two parties can rule by themselves; three parties must form a coalition in order to form a government. I liked the main point of the book, which is that in two party democracy parties converge on the views of the median voter wiki entry. This is retrospective voting; see Fiorina and Key Particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Contents[ edit ] In chapter eight of the book Downs explains how the concept of ideology is central to his theory. First, although the low individual returns to voting are repeatedly discussed, the idea that intelligent voting is a public good was completely omitted.
However, this logic ignores individual party incentives. In anticipation of such criticism, Downs quotes Milton Friedman in chapter two that: This leads to a conclusion that rational voters will rarely turn out to vote. A two-party democracy cannot provide stable and effective government unless there is a large measure of ideological consensus among its citizens.
Either way, intelligent voting is very likely to be under-provided.Anthony Downs has 29 books on Goodreads with ratings. Anthony Downs’s most popular book is An Economic Theory of Democracy. An economic theory of democracy. Ex-Library.
by Downs, Anthony and a great selection of similar Used, New and Collectible Books available now at ultimedescente.com Downs basically discounts huge swaths of motivating forces of action and focuses essentially on cost-benefit analysis. It's ultimately unconvincing. If I wanted to study economics, I would have taken economics.
This book takes all of the fun out of the study of politics and government and turns it into a box of sand/5(11). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy Author(s): Anthony Downs ACTION IN A DEMOCRACY' ANTHONY DOWNS Chicago, Illinois I developed further in my forthcoming book, An Economic Theory of Democracy, to be published by Harper & Bros.
2 See Gerhard Colm. Anthony Downs is the author of An Economic Theory of Democracy ( avg rating, ratings, 9 reviews, published ), Still Stuck in Traffic ( av /5(19).
Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics.
His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in Reviews: 1.Download